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ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
STRATEGIES FOR FITTING NEW SCIENCE INTO OLD LAW
BY
J.B. RuHL*
This Article explores the administrative reform potential that
exists for integrating new knowledge about ecosystem services into
Clean Water Act (C WA) regulatory programs as an. example for all
environmental laws. Part II of the Article reviews the relevant general
rules of federal administrative law governing agency interpretation of
the policy space available under statutory authority for integrating new
science into decision maing Part Ill then explores the strategies an
agency such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency can
use under those rules to integrate the concept of ecosystem services
into regulatory programs by searching for statutory provisions to
support what I call "direct protection" authority and "performance
metric" authority. Part IV of the Article turns to the dredge and fill
permit program of section 404 of the CWA and the water quality
standards and total maximum daily load program of section 303 of the
CWA as its case studies, showing how opportunities for and obstacles
to the two integration strategies arise in the structure and text of the
statute. The Article closes with some thoughts on a more overarching
agenda for worldng ecosystem services into existing federal
en vironmental protection programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act (CWA)' has proven to be a remarkably effective
and adaptive law over its forty-year history. It is widely credited with being
the catalyst for the great strides our nation has achieved in improving water
quality and protecting public health.' But it is an old law, and it has not been
updated through significant legislative reform in over two decades.3 In that
time, it has become apparent that the statute's statutory structure has failed
to keep -pace with scientific advances, one prominent example being
4
research on ecosystem services.
Ecosystem services flow to human communities in four streams: 1)
provisioning services are commodities such as food, wood, fiber, and water,
2) regulating services moderate or control environmental conditions, such as
flood control by wetlands, water purification by aquifers, and carbon
sequestration by forests; 3) cultural services include recreation, education,
and aesthetics; and 4) supporting services, such as nutrient cycling, soil
formation, and primary production, make the other three service streams
possible.' As research that has emerged and hurgeoned over the past decade
has shown, aquatic resources provide bountiful supplies of ecosystem
services to human populations, including through groundwater recharge,
storm and flood mitigation, sediment control, water purification, climate
1 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
2 See generally William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REv. 537 (2004) (explaining how the CWA combined technology-based
limits and environmental quality-based standards to curb water pollution).
3 The last set of signifi cant amendments was enacted in 1987. Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
4 Ecosystem services are economically valuable benefits humans derive from ecological
resources directly, such as storm surge mitigation provided by coastal dunes and marshes, and
indirectly, such as nutrient cycling that supports crop production. Natural capital consists of the
ecological resources that produce these service values, such as forests, riparian habitat, and
wetiands. For descriptions of natural capital and ecosystem services, see MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING (2005), available at
http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEms (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997), and Robert Costanza et al.,
The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997). For
coverage of the emergence of the ecosystem services concept in law and policy, see J.B. RUHL,
STEVEN E. KIIAFr & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTM SERVICES 85-168
(2007), J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Servces, 22
J. LAND USE & ENvTL L. 157 (2007), and James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Fuyture
of Ecosystemu Servces, 21 J. LAND USE & ENvrL L. 133 (2006).
5 This typology of ecosystem services is developed in MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
supra note 4, at vi.
1382 Vol. 40:1381
HeinOnline  -- 40 Envtl. L. 1382 2010
NEW SCIENCE, OLDIAW 1
regulation, water supply, and recreation.' The connections between the
CWA, the central objective of which is "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"7 and the
conservation of ecosystem services thus seem obvious and numerous, yet
nowhere in the CWA are these connections made explicit." This Article
addresses the questions of whether, where, and how those connections can
be drawn so that new knowledge about ecosystem services can be
integrated into decision making under the CWA.
To be sure, the CWA is not the only environmental law that has fallen
behind the times in this respect. Ecologists and economists have been
forging the theory and application of the ecosystem services concept since
the mid-1990s, but only in the past few years has the concept begun to
register in any meaningful way in federal environmental policy.10 Many of the
environmental laws Congress passed in the 1970s have undergone little more
than superficial reforms, if any, in the past twenty years," meaning new
scientific concepts such as ecosystem services often find no clear home in
existing statutes. This gradual scientific atrophying of environmental
statutes has put tremendous pressure on administrative agencies such as the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adapt regulatory
programs to stay up to date with new knowledge and emerging policy
challenges. In some cases agencies have carried out sweeping reforms at the
administrative policy level, such as the broad reforms the United States
Department of the Interior accomplished for the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)'2 in the 1990s." But the latitude agencies have to engage in substantive
administrative reform in the absence of substantive legislative reform
depends on the text and interpretations of the existing statutes on the
books." Each statute thus presents its own specialized "policy space" within
which an agency could, if so inclined, adjust the regulatory program through
administrative reform to reflect new knowledge.
6 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: WETLANDS
AND WATER (2005), available athttp://www.maweb.org/documents/document.358.aspx.pdf.
7
-Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
8 See Robin Kundis Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Fnctional
Approach to Clean WaterAct Jurisdiction after Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 635, 636-37 (2008).
9 See Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Servces.- A Fragmentary History, in
NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 11, 11;
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 158-61.
10 See RUHL, KRAFr & LANT, supra note 4, at 127-57; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 163-64.
11 See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent The Demise ofDeliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 621-32 (2006).
12 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
13 See John D. Leshey, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior A Preliminary
View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 211-16 (2001); J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the
Post-Babbittonian Era-Are There Any?, 14 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 419, 430-34 (2004);
Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragnent of
Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2380-82 (2000).
. 14 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-387 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing theories and rules of statutory
interpretation, including rules of judicial deference to agency interpretations).
2010]1, 383
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This Article explores the administrative reform potential that exists for
integrating new knowledge about ecosystem services into CWA regulatory
programs as an example for all environmental laws. Part 11 of the Article
reviews the relevant general rules of federal administrative law governing
agency interpretation of the policy space available under statutory
authority. 5 Part Il then explores the strategies an agency such as EPA can
use under those rules to integrate the concept of ecosystem services into
regulatory programs by searching for statutory provisions to support what I
call "direct protection" authority and "performance metric" authority. Part lV
of the Article turns to the dredge and'fill permit program of section 404 of
the CWA'6 and the water quality standards and total maximum daily load
(TMDL) program of section 303 of the CWA"' as its case studies, showing
how opportunities for and obstacles to the two integration strategies arise in
the structure and text of the statute. The Article closes with some thoughts
on a more overarching agenda for working ecosystem services into existing
federal environmental protection programs.
H. DEFINING POICY SPACE FOR ADMINISTRATivE REFORM
Initiating regulatory reform in the context of stale statutory authority
can be a significant challenge for an agency. Social and economidc interests
entrenched in and benefitted by the status quo are likely to attempt to bring
political pressure on the agency to protect their interests.' On the other
hand, whatever conditions have prevented Congress from acting for so
long in the relevant field are likely also to dampen the prospect of
legislation negating the agency's regulatory reform.' Much of the action in
this context thus plays out in court as interests opposed to the agency's
reform agenda, whatever form it takes, seek judicial review and rejection
of the agency's decision as inconsistent with existing substantive and
procedural requirements."0
Although judicial review of agency action can take many forms and
involves numerous matters for judicial consideration, the key quest 'ions in
the regulatory reform context are, as Table 1 summarizes, whether the
proposed reform is consistent with the Constitution, authorized by relevant
statutory authority, and compatible with the agency's existing regulations.2 '
If the answer to all three of those questions is affirmative, then all the agency
15 Part II is not exhaustive in this respect. It is intended to familiarize lawyers and non-
lawyers who have not delved into administrative law with the core doctrine of judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations.
16 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S. C. § 1344 (2006).
17 Id § 1313(d).
18 See Kathryn A- Watts, Proposing a Place for Politis in Arbitrary and Capicious Reiew,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 67-68 (2009).
19 Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology ofAccouniabiliy and Politcal Reiew ofAgency Rules,
51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1075-76 (2001).
20 Watts, supra note 18, at 49.
21 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
59, 84-85 (1995).
[Vol. 40:13811384
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need do, if even, is announce the agency's position through what is loosely
described as "guidance. 2 ' Although there is a point at which a substantial
change in approach could be deemed to require promulgation of new
legislative agency regulation , the reality is that agencies can accomplish a
tremendous amount of incremental regulatory reform through guidance and
other "gray law" mechanisms.24
Table 1.
Constitution Existing Existing flAction needed
allows? statute regulations
allows? allow?
Yes Yes Yes New guidance
Yes Yes LNo New regulation
Yes No No Statutory
amendment, then
new regulation
N7No No Constitutional
amendment, then
new statute and
_______regulation
Significant regulatory innovation, however, is often going to require
more significant changes to the existing regulatory regime for which mere
guidance will not suffice as the sole or even primary implementation
mechanism. At one extreme, agency reform action that is inconsistent with
constitutional principles would require an amendment to the Constitution,
which is a highly unlikely prospect. The more salient issue, therefore, is
whether a proposed regulatory reform requires new statutory authorization
or only a new agency regulation.
.From the agency's perspective, being able to carry out the initiative
without need of new legislation may often be preferable, but it is not
always clear whether the existing statute will allow it. If the new proposed
22 "Guidance" has no formal definition, but generally consists of non-legislative agency
pronouncements found in memoranda, training manuals, policy statements, and, of course,
documents labeled as guidance. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules Policy Statements
Guidances, Manuals, and the idke-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41
DuCE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992).
23 The line between when it is permissible for an agency to use non-legislative guidance to
nudge policy incrementally and when it must use a legislative administrative rulemaking is
fuzzy. See Sam Kalen, The Transfoinnation of Modemn Adinistrative Law: Changing
Admninitrations and En vironmental Guidance Documents 35 ECOLOGY L. Q. 657, 674-75 (2008).
24 Guidance is the predominant form of agency policy expressions. See Connor N. Raso,
Strategic or Sincere? Analyzig Agency Use of Guidance Doctuments 119 YALE. L.. 782, 788
(2010); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE U. 1463, 1469 (1992).
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regulation extends, departs from, or conflicts with prior agency regulations
and practice, the agency thus must predict whether the proposal is
permissible -under the existing statute. In making this prediction, the
agency must walk the line between two types of error: a false positive, in
which the agency incorrectly concludes existing laws allow a new
regulatory innovation, and a false negative, in which the agency incorrectly
believes existing laws do not allow the regulatory innovation.
One of the key principles of federal administrative law provides
considerable latitude for agencies in navigating between these two types of
regulatory reform error. In Chevron USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron),-' the United States Supreme Court held
that ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to administer
are congressional delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory
26gap in a reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps, the Court explained,
involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make
27
than courts. Thus, if a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing
agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to
defer to the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's
reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation.28
Chevron has many nuances' and has received considerable favorable
and critical attention in legal and policy scholarship,3a but its core principle
remains quite active and enforced in the courts in the context of an agency
regulatory promulgation interpreting the agency's organic statutes. Indeed,
more recently the Supreme Court explained that Chevron applies even
when an agency is not merely extending existing policy, but also when it
has completely changed directions under its statute.2 ' In National Cable &
Telecommnunications Association v: Brand X Internet Services (Brand X),
the Court held that
if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, "change
is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion
provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency." "An
initial agency interpretation is not instantiy carved in stone. On the contrary,
25 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26 Id at 843-44; see also H. Miles Foy, III, On Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretati on,
62 ADMIN. L. REv. 291, 315-17 (20 10) (discussing judicial deference to agency interpretation of
statutes).
27 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
28 Idat 845.
29 See, e.g, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (explaining circumstances
in which Chevron does not apply).
30 See, e.g, Jack M. Beermann, End the FailedChevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Fadled and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REv. 779, 782 (2010) (describing
Chevron as "administrative law's most highly analyzed doctrine" and criticizing its theoretical
bases and practical applications). A Westiaw journals & law reviews (JLR) database search of
"Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." on November 20th, 2010
yielded over 3100 results.
31 Nat'l Cable & Telecomins. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).
1386 Vol. 40:1381
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the agency ... must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis," for example, in response to changed factual
circumstances, or a change in administrations.32
The Brand X Court went even further to hold that "[a] court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion,"'1 and thus "[olnly a judicial precedent
holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces
a conflicting agency construction."3n
Hence, in predicting whether a proposed regulatory reform requires
new legislation or only new regulation, an agency deciding that a new
regulationi will suffice can take safe harbor in Chevron and Brand X Only if
it is clear from the statute that the agency has no authority to carry out the
reform through regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute must
the agency depend on legislative reform to implement the policy. The next
section applies these principles to devise strategies for integrating
ecosystem services into agency decision making.
III. STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATIN'G ECOSYSTEM SERVICES INTO EXISTING
REGULATORY PROGRAMS
When taken togethe *r, Chevron and Brand Xprovide agencies like EPA
the room to experiment with regulatory innovations based. on new
knowledge, such as the now well-established and growing body of
knowledge on ecosystem services. It is not always necessary, however, to
rest on Chevron, as some statutes may clearly authorize use of ecosystem
services concepts in agency decision making. But the 2008 Farm Bil,n' which
requires the United States Department of Agriculture to "establish technical
guidelines that outline science-based methods to measure the environmental
services benefits from conservation and land management activities in order
to facilitate the participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in
emerging environmental services markets,"6 is at present the only such
example at the federal level. At the other extreme, some statutes may make
32 Id (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996), and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64); see also Darren H. Weiss,
Casenotes, X Misses the Spot- Fernandez v. Keisler and the (Mis)Appropriation of Brand X by
the Board ofinnggratf on Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L..REv. 889, 892 (2010) (arguing that BrandX
is potentially injurious to the legal system because it allows agencies to avoid statutory
interpretations that they find unfavorable).
33 BrandX~ 545 hiS, at 982.
34 Id at 982-83.
35 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (2008).
36 Id § 1245(a). For developments in this program, see U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Office of
Environental Markets, http:/www.fs.fed.ustecosystermservices/OE~lindex.shtn-d/index.shtnil
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
2010] 1387-
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it clear that ecosystem services cannot be taken into consideration. When
deciding whether to list a species under the ESA, for example, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service must take only the biological status of the
species into account, and thus could not consider as a reason to list the
species the econom-ic benefits of ecosystem services that would be provided
once the species and its habitat came under the statute's protection.37 When
a statute is not clear in either of these directions, however, Chevron and
Brand Xare controlling.
If an agency such as EPA were to decide to integrate ecosystem
services concepts into its regulatory program, therefore, the challenge would
be to locate provisions in the relevant statute that can provide the platform
for reasonable interpretations that using ecosystem services science in
decision making is within the scope of the agency's authority. Two different
approaches seem promising in this respect. First, a statute may contain
provisions suggesting that the agency can directly protect and manage
natural resources for the purpose of conserving the flow of ecosystem
services to human populations. For example, if a statute mandated that an
agency manage or protect natural resources for, among other things, the
.public welfare," one could reasonably make the argument that ecosystem
services, because of their economic value and importance to human health
and well being, enhance public welfare and thus maintaining or enhancing
the flow of ecosystem services can be the direct focus of regulatory efforts
under the statute. Declines in the flow of ecosystem services thus could be
used under this "direct protection" authority to justify changes in the
resource management protocol specifically for the purpose of restoring
those flows.
The other approach-a fallback in the event no statutory hook credibly
supports the direct protection strategy-is to locate terms in a statute that
would reasonably support using ecosystem services as a criterion for
determining whether the directives of the statute are being adequately
fulfilled. For example, if a statute mandated that an agency manage or
protect natural resources for the purposes of maintaining "environmental
quality," one could reasonably argue that a credible way of determining if
environmental quality is maintained is to examine trends in 'the flow of
ecosystem services from the resource. Declines in the flow of ecosystem
services thus could be used under this "performance metric" authority for
deciding how to implement management changes for the resource, the
incidental consequence of which would be restoring or enhancing the
ecosystem services.
37 The ESA requires that species listing determinations be made "solely on the basis of the
best scientific and conmmercial data available." Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006). Congress added this provision to thla statute i 1982 specifically to
overturn the Reagan administration's policy of applying economic impact analysis to species
listing decisions. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-8315, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2860, 2861 ("(Elcononnc considerations have no relevance to determinations regarding the
status of species and the economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 12291 ... Will not
apply to any phase of the listing process.").
[ ol..40:13811388
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. Using this two-pronged strategy, the challenge for agencies hoping to
integrate ecosystem services into regulatory programs under statutes that do
not clearly authorize or prohibit doing so is to search for provisions that
reasonably can be interpreted to provide either direct protection authority
or'performance metric authority. While direct protection authority may be
preferable for agencies, hoping to establish ecosystem services as a secure
focal point of regulatory policy, the advantage of the performance metric
authority strategy is that it may present more flexibility for creative statutory
interpretation, as Congress is less likely to put statutory sideboards on how
agencies measure regulatory performance than it is on the scope of agencies'
regulatory authority.38The next section provides two case studies under the
CWA illustrating this searching and interpretation process.
IV. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The app .ropriate place to start with a holistic inquiry into the scope of
the CWA, as with any statute, is with its statement of purose-"to restore
and maintain the chem-ical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. "' One will search the statutory text in vain, however, for clues as to
what "chemical, physical, and biological integrity" means. Some hints may
be found in the laundry list of goals and policies Congress appended to its
statement of purpose for the CWA, which include eliminating discharges of
pollutants 4 0 establishing interim water quality goals for fish, wildlife, and
recreation,"' and controlling nonpoint sources of pollution.42 But these do not
put meat on the bones of "integrity" and if anything broaden more than
narrow the potential reach of the statute. When one turns to the operative
language of the GWA, moreover, matters get no less ambiguous. As
Professor Robert Adler has observed in his probing review of the meaning
behind what he calls the "water quality trilogy" of chemical, physical, and
biological integrity, the statute's provisions are riddled with anomalies and
inconsistencies in this respect.43
But Adler does find evidence of two overarching themes. First, his
review of the legislative history concludes that
both houses of Congress seem to have given the concept of aquatic ecosystem
integrity due deliberation, indicating that the Act's opening phrase was not
intended as a mere rhetorical flourish. It does appear the Act's chief sponsors
in the House of Representatives and the Senate disagreed on the precise
38 Timothy A Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory
Theo.0- fi7exible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Communzity as a Model for the
Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 481 (1995) (discussing how Congress
neglects to focus on agency performance).
39 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
40 Id § 1251(a)(1).
41 Id § 1251(a)(2).
42 Id § 1251(a)(7).
43 See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive
Objectives of Ph ysical and Biological Integrty, 33 ENvrL. L. 29,39-43 (2003).
3892010]
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meaning of the statutory objective, as is true of many other provisions of the
Act. The Senate Committee's understanding of the concept of integrity seems
to suggest a return to -pristine, natural ecological conditions, while the House
Committee suggested that the concept of integrity implies a return to natural
ecosystem structure and functions.44
So there is support for the proposition that the CWA is amorphously
ecological in scope, with natural conditions and functions; on ecosystem
scales being an intended implementation yardstick. The problem Adler
detects, however, is that the regulatory teeth of the statute and of EPA's
implementation for the most part have been sharpened on the chemiucal
component of the water quality trilogy through a focus on controlling
pollutants, with not enough attention to addressing the broader problem of
pollution . 45 As he observes,
while progress has been made in moving toward "chemical" integrity, and
while significant resources and programs have been directed at discharges of
chemical pollutants, both the "physical" and "biological" integrity books in the
trilogy have remained largely hortatory. Empirical evidence shows measurable
gains in reducing chemical pollution, but in the thirty years since the law was
passed, the overall health of the nation's freshwater aquatic ecosystems has
declined dramatically.46
Adler thus concludes that "neither the federal n 'or the state agencies
charged with implementing the CWA have taken full advantage of their
existing legal authority to address the physical and biological books in the
water quality trilogy," and hence "[ult is time for EPA to revisit its virtually
exclusive focus on chemidcal impairments to our aquatic ecosystems.""7 That
is precisely the objective in exploring how to work ecosystem services
science into the statute. The two case studies that follow illustrate that the
CWA presents ample opportunities for doing so, if one thinks creatively.
44 Id. at 46-47 (footnote omitted).
4~5 See id. at 34-39.
46 Id. at 31. The CWA's definition of "pollutant" identifies a long and wide list of specific
waste streams, such as dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, garbage, chemical
wastes, heat, and sand. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006). By contrast, the definition of "pollution" is
"the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological
integrity of water." Id § 1362(19). Adler's study focuses on the distinctions between the two
terms as used in the operative provisions of the statute and the untapped potential of provisions
addressing pollution. See Adler, supra note 43, at 34-35.
47 Adler, supra note 43, at 32. EPA recently has expressed agreement on this score,
conceding that "as EPA's water quality protection program has evolved, it has become apparent
that chemical criteria alone, without the criteria for the biological and physical/habitat
components of water bodies, are insufficient to fuly achieve the goals of the CWA2" U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Water Quality Handbook - Introduction, http://www.epagov/waterscience-
standards/handbook/intro.htmil (last visited Nov..20, 2010).
1390 [Vol. 40:1381
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A. Section 404 Dredge and F11 Program-The Direct Protection Approach
Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army,
through the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), to "issue,
permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill material in the navigable
waters of the United States at specified disposal sites."a Although the Corps
is the front-line regulatory agency for administering this permit program,
pursuant to section 404(b)(1) of the CWA, EPA must promulgate substantive
permitting standards focused on environmental factors, known as the
"404(b)(1) Guidelines," which the Corps must follow when issuing permits
for disposal of dredged or fill material." Under section 404(c), EPA also may
deny, or "veto," any disposal site if the discharge "will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas'
(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."'
Thus, under the section 404, and subject to specified exceptions, wetlands
subject to federal jurisdiction may be filled only if the Corps grants a permit
in accordance with EPA's 404(b)(1) Guidelines. These permits, known
ubiquitously as "404 permits," "wetland permits," or "Corps permits," have
become the cornerstone for federal protection of wetland resources.5'
When a land development project involves filling of wetland areas
regulated under section 404 of the CWA, the Corps usually requires
compensatory mitigation for the loss of wetland resources as a condition of
permit approval.52 The compensatory mitigation program suffered withering
criticism for decades on a number of bases, however, one being that it failed
to account for displacement of ecosystem services between fill sites and
compensatory mitigation sites." Critics thus urged the agencies to
incorporate ecosystem services into the array of resources directly
protected under section 404 .54
48 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (2006).
49 Id. § 1344(b).
50 Id. § 1344(c).
51 For background on the scope of federal wetlands regulation, see Douglas R. Williams &
Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY:
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 1-26 (Douglas R. Williams et al. eds., 2005).
52 33 C.F.R. pt. 332 (2009) (establishing standards and criteria for compensatory mitigation
through permits issued by the Corps pursuant to section 404 of CWA); see JESSICA WILKINSON &
JARED THOMPSON, ENVTL. L. INST., 2005 STATUS REPORT ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/
2006_06_01_wetlandsELIMitigation2005.pdf (discussing comprehensive history and
background on the compensatory mitigation program).
5 Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, 30 NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSLETTER (Envtl. Law Inst.), no. 2, Mar.-Apr. 2008 at 14, 14-15 (surveying and summarizing
literature assessing the performance of federal and state wetland programs). For the most
prominent of these critical studies, see COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL.,
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001).
54 J.B. Ruh et al., Inplementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section 404
Compensatory Mitigation Program-A Catalyst for Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L.
REV. 251, 256-59 (2009) (summarizing the studies advancing this criticism and providing an
overview of the new rule, but not exploring its statutory grounding).
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Responding to this criticism, in 2008 the Corps and EPA jointly
published final legislative regulations defining standards and procedures for
authorizing compensatory mitigation of impacts to aquatic resources for the
Corps permits under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.55 Prior to the rule,
the section 404 compensatory mitigation program had been administered
under a mish-mash of guidance, inter-agency memoranda, and other policy
documents issued over the span of seventeen years.'6Although motivated
primarily by the need to bring the program under one coherent regulatory
umbrella, the new rule also for the first time in-troduced ecosystem services
into the mitigation program standards, requiring that "compensatory
mitigation ... should be located where it is most likely to successfully
replace lost ... services."5
EPA and the Corps thus adopted the direct protection approach to
integration of ecosystem services into the section 404 program. The question
that EPA and the Corps had to contemiplate, of course, was whether this is a
permissible interpretation of section 404, especially in light of the facts that
section 404 does not mention ecosystem services at all and that for nearly
two decades EPA and Corps rules for section 404 compensatory mitigation
had not mentioned ecosystem services. Enter Chevron and BrandX.
Clearly, nothing in the language of section 404 unambiguously prohibits
EPA and the Corps from incorporating ecosystem services into. the
compensatory mitigation program, so the question under Chevron is
whether doing so is a reasonable application of the statute. Piecing together
such a case begins with the statute's directive that the 404(b)(1) Guidelines
.shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the
territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section 1343(c) of
this title."5n That provision in turn specifies that the guidelines address the
following criteria, with emphases added to point to the hooks upon which to
hang ecosystem services:
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or7 welfare, including
but not limited to plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches;
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including the transfer,
concentration, and. dispersal of pollutants or their byproducts through
biological, physical, and chemical processes;, changes in marine ecosystem
55 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10,
2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 & 332, and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). For a thorough review and
assessment of the regulation, see Royal C. Gardner et al., Compensating for Wetand Losses
Under the Clean Water Act (Redux):- Evaluating the Federal Compensatory Mitigation
Regulation, 38 STETSON L. REV. 213 (2009).
56 See generally Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitjga&ton Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGM'r. 15
(2Q09), available at httpJ/www.springerlink.com/contentag6l5v755494325v/fulltext.pdf
(discussing comprehensively the collection of policies).
57 33 C.F.R. 332.3(b) (2008). Further details of the nile and its implications are explored
comprehensively in Ruhi et al., supra note 54.
58 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2006).
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divesity, productivity, and stability, and species and community population
changes;
(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and economic
values. .. 5
Through this incorporation of regulatory goals, including human health
and welfare, marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability, and
recreation and economic values, section 404 gives EPA and the Corps ample
room to include ecosystem services among the resources that the program is
designed to protect. Ecosystem services from wetland resources support
human health and welfare; 3 the diversity, stability, and productivity of
marine ecosystems support their capacity to supply those ecosystem
services;"' and providing esthetic, recreation, and other economidc values is
the policy objective of incorporating ecosystem services knowledge into
decision making.6 2 Given the strength of these connections, it would be futile
under Chevron to argue that EPA and the Corps misconstrued section 404
and unreasonably incorporated ecosystem services as a protected
resource, and Brand Xdispenses with any objection that the abrupt change
in policy is impermissible.
B Section 303 Water Quality Standards and TMDL Program-The
Performance Metric Approach
Whereas section 404 expressly focuses agency decision making on
impacts to aquatic ecosystem health, thus providing the base of support for
the direct protection $trategy for incorporating ecosystem services into
decision making, the section 303 program presents much less opportunity
for pursuing that strategy. The performance metric approach, however,
seems well suited to section 303.
The section 303 water quality standards and TMDL program work in
tandem with the permitting provisions of the CWA found in section 402,
which authorizes EPA to issue permits "for the discharge of any pollutant"
other than discharges covered in provisions such as section 404.63 Discharge
is defined in the CWA so as to limit section 402 to pollutants emitted from
.point sources," which are defined as confined and discrete conveyances,
such as pipes and ditches.6' For such discharges, section 402 sets up an
59 Id § 1343(c)(1)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
60 MLLENNIUM EcosYsTEm ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 47.
61 Seeidat 41-45.
62 Thus, the typology of ecosystem services developed in the MILLENNIum EcosYSTEm
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at Ai fig.A.I
63 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). The other permitting provision applies to discharges from
aquaculture. See id § 1328. The Supreme Court has made it clear that these three permitting
provisions are distinct and nonoverlapping in terms of agency jurisdiction. See Coeur Alaska,
Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 1295S. Ct. 2458, 2467 (2009).
64 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (2006) (defining "discharge"); id § 1362(12) (defining "discharge of
pollutant"); id. § 1362(14) (defning "point source"). Agricultural stormwater discharges and
39320101
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extensive technology-based effluent control standards and a permitting
program known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES)."5
Section 303 enters the picture when the technology-based effluent
limits imposed on NPDES dischargers under section 402, even with full
compliance, are inadequate to meet water quality goals for specific water
bodies. Section 303(c) requires states to prepare and present for EPA
approval water quality standards consisting of "the designated uses of the
navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters
based upon such uses."66 To assist states in this function, section 304
requires EPA to develop guidelines for establishing water quality criteria
"accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge. "6 1 Section
303(d)(1)(A), in turn, requires states to identify waters for which the
technology-based effluent limitations imposed through section 402 permits
are not adequate to attain* an applicable water quality standard,68 and
section 303(d)(1)(G) requires states to establish and implement for such
listed waters the "total maximum daily load ... for ... pollutants" as a means
of reducing discharges to levels that will attain the 'water quality standard.69
Nothing in these provisions overtly addresses ecosystem services
science one way or the other, hence, as with section 404, EPA would have to
dig deeper into them to search for and interpret authority for the agency to
incorporate ecosystem services science into the section 303 program. At the
threshold level of such an inquiry, section 303 divides into two distinct
components-the section 303(c) water quality standards component and the
section 303(d) TMDL and load allocation component. The load allocation
component is the regulatory branch of section 303 and thus where one
would search for direct protection authority. But section 303(d) is a set of
dry technical provisions -devoid of opportunities for creative interpretation
along these lines. All the policy space in section 303 lies instead in the water
quality standards component, which is fundamentally about establishing the
criteria for assessing the performance of technology-based effluent
standards imposed on dischargers under section 402 NPDES permits. Hence,
if there is ecosystem services gold to be mined in the section 303 program, it
irrigation return flows are excluded from point sources even if conveyed through ditches, pipes,
and other means normally considered a point source. Id § 1362(14).
65 See JAMES SALzmAN & BAirTON H. THiOMPSON, JR., ENVIONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 150-61
(3d ed. 2010) (overview of the point source permit program).
66 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006). EPA must establish water quality standards if a state
fails to do so adequately. See id § 1313(c)(3). EPA regulations define "designated uses" as
"those uses specified in water quality standards for each water body or segment whether or not
they are being attained," 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(f) (2010), and "water quality criteria" as 'elements of
State water quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative
statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use. When criteria are met,
water quality will generally protect the designated use." Id § 131.3(b).
67 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2006).
68~ Id § 1313(d)(1)(A).
69 Id § 1313(d)(1)(C).
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will .come by searching for provisions in section 3 03(c) that can reasonably
be interpreted to provide performance metric authority. 70
- The first such provision is a potential bonanza for the performance
metric approach: section 303(c)(2)(A) requires that water quality standards
"shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, -enhance the quality-
of water and serve the purposes of this chapter."7' The provision goes on to
require that the standards take into consideration the "use and value" of the
water body for, among other things, 'public water supplies, propagation of
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and
other purposes."" Furthermore, EPA's authority under section 304 to
develop guidelines the states are to use to designate water quality standards
under section 303(c) requires that EPA consider "all identifiable effects on
health and welfare, including, but not limited to ... shorelines, beaches,
esthetics, and recreation which may be expected from the presence of
pollutants in any body of water,"'' as well as "the effects of pollutants on
biological community diversity, productivity, and stability."7
As with section 404 -(through: its incorporation of section 403), these
provisions contain strong connections to ecosystem services, opening the
door wide to incorporating ecosystem services science broadly into water
quality standards formulation. By using ecosystem services such as
groundwater recharge and flood control to describe designated uses of
water bodies, and by specifying levels of ecosystem service flows to human
populations as water quality criteria, EPA could move the section 303
program closer to Adler's vision of the trilogy of physical, chemical, and
70 Professor Robin Craig has correctly suggested that water quality standards already
implicitly capture some ecosystem service values by designating uses such as recreation and
provision of drinking water. See Craig, supra note 8, at 638. Like many environmental laws,
however, these extend only to provisioning and cultural services, not to the regulating and
supporting services such as sediment control, flood suppression, and nutrient cycling that are
generally treated as public goods. See Ruim, KRA~r & LANT, supra note 4, at 23-30 (discussing
the distinction between the different categories). My proposal extends her reasoning to build
the regulating and suppQrting flows of ecosystem services more explicitly and pervasively into
the section 303(c) water quality standards program. Indeed, in general I find little to be gained
in domestic public or private resource management contexts by describing commodities such
as water or timber as provisioning services and activities such as hunting and fishing as cultural
services. Markets obviously already exist for these ecosystem services in the private resources
context, and public policy has for decades hashed out how they are delivered on public lands.
See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURcEs LAw 2 (6th ed.
2007). The challenge is how to incorporate regulating and supporting services into market and
regulatory institutions.
71 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006). EPA regulations define "serve the purposes of the Act" to
mean[] that water quality standards should, wherever attainable, provide water quality
for the protection and propagation of fish, shelifish and wildlife and for recreation in and
on the water and take into consideration their use and value of public water supplies,
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, recreation in and on the water, and
agricultural, industrial, and other purposes including navigation.
40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2010).
72 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006).
73 Id. § 1314(a)(1)(A).
74 Id § 1314(a)(1)(C).
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biological water quality goals. For example, if adequate capacity for flood
control were described as a water quality standard for a water body,
pollutants degrading the aquatic vegetation contributing to that flood control
capacity could trigger an impairment finding and the appropriate responses
under the TMDL component of section 303. The language of sections 303 and
304 surely would support doing so under Chevron, and the fact that the
agency has not done so in the past would present no obstacle given BrandX
The hitch, as noted above, is that as a performance metric program, the
water quality standards component of section 303 depends entirely on the load
allocation component of section 303(d) for its regulatory implementation.
Also, although nonpoint sources such as agriculture, urban runoff, and
unspecified sources are significant contributors to water quality
impairment 7 5 EPA is limited under 303(d) in its ultimate reach to regulating
discharge of pollutants from point sources subject to section 402 NPDES
permits .76 Nevertheless, states must identify a water body that fails to meet
water quality standards as impaired even if nonpoint sources are
contributing to the impairnent, and the load allocation must include such
nonpoint sources. if states choose not to regulate nonpoint sources and
thereby fail adequately to implement the TMDL program, EPA can withdraw
federal grant money from the state.'
Hence, although it is true that "[bly limiting the effective control
mechanisms to total maximum daily loads of pollutants, Congress included
i n section 303(d) no direct mechanisms to redress other sources of
pollution," 5 there is still good reason to include ecosystem services as one of
the performance metrics of water quality stanidards. EPA recently has
claimed to be comm-itted to modernizing the section 303 program by busting
the water quality standards regime out of its chemical focus and moving it
closer to Adler's trilogy vision.80 Using ecosystem services science to do so
75 See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2004 REPORTING CYCLE at 12, 16, 20 (2009), available at
htip://www.epagov/owow/305b/2004reportl (click on "Findings") (finding im~pairment to rivers
and streams, lakes, ponds, reservoirs, bays, and estuaries from nonpoint sources).
76 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006).
77 See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002).
78 See id
79 Adler, sup~a note 43, at 42.
80 EPA has recently stated:
EPA will be developing methodologies and criteria in areas beyond the traditional
chemical-specific type criteria of the past. Areas of scientific examination and potential
regulatory controls include criteria to protect wildlife, wetlands, and sediment quality;
biological criteria to better define desired biological communities in aquatic ecosystems;
and nutrient criteria . ... Implementation of these various types of criteria will be
influenced by the environmental concerns in specific watersheds.
In an expanded effort to protect ecology, there will be increasing emphasis on the
watershed approach by assessing all potential and actual threats to a watershed's
integrity....
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will allow EPA to regulate point source discharges in water bodies with
impaired ecosystem services, will call attention to the contribution of
nonpoint sources to ecosystem services impairment, and will put pressure
on states to address those nonpomnt sources. Chevron and Brand X do not
allow EPA to overcome the structural limits of regulatory authority under
section 303(d), but they could pave the way for EPA to use sect ions 303(c) and
304 as a platform for makcing ecosystem services an important performance
metric of the section 303 program.
V. CONCLUSION
Speaking about one of the CWA's siblings, the Clean Air Ac ,t,8 ' the
Supreme Court recently observed that Congress understood when it
designed the statute "that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air
Act obsolete," and hence "[tihe broad language of [the statute] reflects an
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such
obsolescence."" This principle, of course, is not limited to the Clean Air
Act-the CWA embodies the very essence of employing broad language to
impart the flexibility needed to incorporate scientific developments. Indeed,
Congress made doing so an explicit commnand.n
The science of ecosystem services has emerged as a powerful
organizing principle of interdisciplinary, ecological, economic, and social
research, and has begun to take hold in policy formulation. Within EPA, for
example, the Office of Research and Development's Ecosystem Services
Research Program
is transforming the way we account for the type, quality, and magnitude of
nature's goods and services so that they can be considered in environmental
management decisions. The research is providing the data, methods, models,
and tools needed by states, communities, and tribes to understand the cost and
benefits of using ecosystem services."'
Over the next few years, there will be more emphasis on developing effective risk
reduction strategies that include both traditional and non-traditional controls and
approaches.
Future program directions in criteria development and then adoption and
implementation of water quality standards will be based on the principle of ecological
and human health risk reduction through sound and implementable science.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 47. In July 2010 EPA announced its plan to propose a
limited set of changes to its water quality standards regulations by Summer 2011. Office of
Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Water Quality Standards Regulatory Changes Fact Sheet,
http://water.epa gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/wqsjfactsheet.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
82 Massachusetts v. U.S. Envti. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
83 E.g. Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33 § U.S. C. 1314(a)(1) (2006) (directing EPA to
develop water quality guidelines "accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge").
84 Office of Research & Dev., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ecosystem Services Research
Program, http://epa-gov/ord/esrp/ (last visited Nov. 20,2010).
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Clearly this is the type of scientific advancement that Congress
contemplated agencies would incorporate into administration of
environmental statutes such as the CWA. The judicial review principles
embodied in Chevron and Brand X facilitate this incorporation process by
allowing agencies to adapt statutory provisions to new knowledge and by
relieving agencies of the concern that change is impermissible because
"that's not how we've done it." As Adler's work emphasizes, the narrow
chemical pollutant focus EPA has taken with its CWA authority is neither
demanded by the statute nor consistent with contemporary scientific
perspectives on aquatic ecosystem health and integrity. Incorporating
ecosystem services science into the CWA programs as broadly as possible will
be one important component of moving the statute forward in this respect.
This Article has laid out the strategies for so incorporating ecosystem
services science and illustrated their application with two cases studies of
discrete CWA programs. Agencies like EPA and the Corps, if they are
committed to staying scientifically relevant, need not and should not wait for
Congress to graft new science into statutes. Instead, agencies should scour
statutes like the CWA and other environmental laws for opportunities to
interpret the existence of direct protection and performance metric
authority as leverage points for incorporating new science into evolving
regulatory programs. To be sure, the science of ecosystem services should
not be sitting on the shelf waiting to be dropped into the CWA and other
environmental statutes. Futrther research on ecosystem services tailored to
regulatory programs such as section 404 and section 303 will be needed,
which fortunately has begun at EPA,8" and numerous policy design questions
must be addressed.8 But by no means should the existing set of
environmental statutes themselves be seen as insurmountable obstacles
simply because they were designed before the concept of ecosystem
85 EPA's Office of Research and Development in 2007 initiated its Ecosystem Services
Research Program (ESRP) to focus on policy-relevant ecosystem services research. See OFFICE
OF RESEARCH & D~y., U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESEARCH TO VALuE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES:
IDENTIFYING, QUANTIFYING, AND ASSESSING NATURE'S BENEFITS (2007), available at
http//epagov/ord/esrp/PdfsESRP-overview-fact-sheet-final.pdf (discussing the importance of
ecosystem services in researching wetlands). This research provides a foundation to enable the
assessment of *an array of core ecosystem services provided by freshwater and coastal
wetlands. See id (stating that this research will determine how the position of wetlands on the
landscape alters the provision of ecosystem services). In addition, ESRP research is developing
methods to quantitatively assess other regulating and supporting services from wetlands,
including flood control and storm surge protection, maintenance of water quality, nutrient
cycling, and carbon storage and sequestration. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENvrL.
PROT. AGENC-i, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES RESEARCH FOCUSES ON WETLALNDS (2007), available at
http://www.epagov/ORD/npd/pdfs/erp)-place-based-research-wetlands-factsheet.pdf (discussing
the range of benefits gained from wetland ecosystems that contribute to human well-being);
Office of Research & Dev., U.S. Envti. Prot. Agency, Ecosystem Services Research Program:
Basic Information, http://epa.gov/ord/esrp/basic-info.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010)
(discussing the future research of the ESRP and how it is designed to measure and assess
these ecosystem services).
86 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Sempces & Natural Capital: Reconceiving
Environental Managemen4 17 N.Y.U. ENVTm L.J. 460 (2008) (outlining policy design issues for
ecosystem services).
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services took hold in the scientific community. Fitting new science into old
laws will take political will and some creative interpretations of stale laws,
but it will be necessary if our environmental statutes are to remain relevant
and effective. As this Article has shown, the new science of ecosystem
services presents just such an opportunity.
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